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ABSTRACT 
 
Improving our understanding of hopelessness is central to suicide prevention.  This is 
the first study to investigate whether generalized expectancies for the future 
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(optimism/pessimism) and specific future-oriented cognitions (future thinking) 
interact to predict hopelessness and dysphoria.  To this end, participants completed 
measures of future thinking, optimism/pessimism and affect at Time 1 and measures 
of affect and stress at Time 2, 10-12 weeks later.  Results indicated that changes in 
hopelessness but not dysphoria were predicted by the interaction between positive 
future thinking (but not negative future thinking), optimism/pessimism and stress 
beyond initial levels of hopelessness and dysphoria.    Additional moderating analyses 
are also reported.  These findings point to the fruits of integrating personality and 
cognitive processes, to better understand hopelessness. 
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In recent decades, there has been considerable interest in the concepts of 
optimism/pessimism, future thinking and hopelessness.  However, given their shared 
focus (i.e., on the future), it is surprising that little research has investigated how these 
variables relate to each other.  This is even more noteworthy as hopelessness is the 
psychological construct most closely related to suicidality (O’Connor, Armitage, & 
Gray, 2006).  The brief synopsis of the optimism/pessimism and future thinking 
literatures which follows highlights the key theoretical and empirical issues which are 
pertinent to the present study. 
Optimism/Pessimism 
There has been a proliferation of research focused on optimism and 
pessimism.  Defined as generalized positive and negative outcome expectancies (cf. 
Armor & Taylor, 1998), they are proximal predictors of adjustment (Scheier & 
Carver, 1985).  Carver and Scheier (1998) describe optimists as those people who 
expect good experiences in the future and pessimists as those who expect bad 
experiences (see also Carver & Scheier, 1990, Scheier & Carver, 1992; 2003).  This 
conceptualization of optimism/pessimism within their self-regulation model is 
grounded in the expectancy-value models of motivation which suggest that all 
behavior is organized around (a) the pursuit of goals or the avoidance of ‘anti-goals’1 
(value component) and (b) the degree of confidence or doubt about a goal’s 
attainability (expectancy component; Carver & Scheier, 1998).    
Compared to pessimists, optimists are individuals who have greater 
confidence in their ability to attain goals (i.e., approach system) and avoid anti-goals 
(i.e., inhibition system), they are better at identifying suitable goals and more 
tenacious with respect to goal pursuit. The logical extension, therefore, is that when 
an individual cannot identify a suitable attainable goal, they either remain committed 
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to the unattainable goal or they disengage; either way, they experience psychological 
distress, for example, hopelessness.  Hopelessness is distinct from pessimism.  
Pessimism is thought to be a relatively stable personality dimension whereas 
hopelessness is a state – the individual’s current negative view of the future.   
Future Thinking and Hopelessness 
 A parallel, but separate, literature concerns the generation of specific future 
expectations in the etiology and maintenance of hopelessness and suicidal behavior 
(Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; MacLeod, Pankhania, Lee and Mitchell, 1997; MacLeod, 
Rose & Williams, 1993, MacLeod et al., 1998; O’Connor, Connery & Cheyne, 
2000a).   This literature stemmed from a desire to clarify the concept of hopelessness 
beyond its original formulation in the 1970s (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 
1974).  To this end, MacLeod and colleagues were interested to determine whether 
hopelessness characterized by negative future anticipations was functionally 
equivalent to the absence of positive future expectations.  To investigate this, they 
devised the future thinking task, in which participants are asked to think of potential 
future experiences (essentially goals and anti-goals) that (i) they are looking forward 
to and (ii) they are worried about (see MacLeod et al., 1993; 1997).  Their findings 
demonstrated that the presence of negative future expectancies is not functionally 
equivalent to the absence of positive future expectancies (MacLeod et al., 1993).  
Suicidal individuals, when compared with controls or depressed individuals who are 
not suicidal, are impaired in their ability to generate positive thoughts for the future 
but do not differ in terms of the number of negative thoughts that they are worried 
about (MacLeod et al., 1997; see also O’Connor & Sheehy, 2000).  The findings from 
the future thinking literature are also analogous to those from Clark and Watson’s 
(1991) seminal, tripartite model of depression.  Specifically, they argue that 
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depression (but not anxiety) is characterised by the presence of negative affectivity 
and the absence of positive affectivity, whereas anxiety is driven by negative 
affectivity, physiological tension and hyperarousal (Clark & Watson, 1991; Watson, 
Clark et al., 1995).  Similarly, within the future thinking literature, it is positive 
thinking (not negative future thinking) which distinguishes between depression and 
hopelessness/suicidality.  Both of these literatures also support the overarching 
premise that the presence of negativity and the absence of positivity are not simply 
opposites, but functionally distinct. 
Although the optimism/pessimism and future thinking literatures have 
developed separately, there is a theoretical and empirical case for integrating them, to 
enhance our understanding of the etiology of hopelessness.  The evidence for this 
integration comes from three sources.  First, Carver and Scheier’s self-regulation 
model suggests that those individuals who are high on hopelessness have difficulty 
identifying goals in the form of specific, future positive expectations.  This may be 
because they have continually failed to meet previous goals and have learned that 
there is no relationship between their behavior and subsequent outcomes. As a result, 
their generalized motivation and expectancies are much reduced leading to partial 
disengagement and hopelessness.  Such a postulation is consonant with predominant 
models of hopelessness and suicidal behavior (Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; 
Baumeister, 1990; O’Connor, 2003; O’Connor & O’Connor, 2003; Williams & 
Pollock, 2001).   
Second, in the light of their findings that optimism interacted with unrealistic 
optimism to produce changes in health-promoting behaviour and knowledge, 
Davidson and Prkachin (1997) suggested that other contextual features or traits might 
operate to influence (moderate) the role that optimism plays in the prediction of 
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healthy behaviours and cognitions.  In our view, future thinking would be one such 
moderating factor. Third, Needles and Abramson (1990) found that the occurrence of 
positive events interacted with an enhancing attributional style to produce a reduction 
in hopelessness among college students within a six week period.  Consequently, in 
the present study we were interested to determine whether cognitions for positive 
events (rather than the occurrence of positive events) interact with 
optimism/pessimism to predict hopelessness.  
Before outlining our specific research hypotheses, four design issues require 
comment.  First, although the future thinking task was originally devised to define 
hopelessness, the evidence suggests that positive future thinking and hopelessness are 
distinct constructs, as illustrated by their low inter-construct correlations (e.g., r= -.37 
and r= -.22; MacLeod et al., 1997 and O’Connor, O’Connor, O’Connor, Smallwood 
& Miles, 2004, respectively).  Second, consistent with the diathesis-stress literature 
which argues that stress moderates the relations between optimism/pessimism and 
well-being (Chang, 1998a,b) and between future thinking and distress (O’Connor et 
al., 2004), we included stress as a moderating variable here.  Third, previous research 
has demonstrated that the symptoms of hopelessness form a cohesive syndrome, 
distinct from depression (Joiner, Steer, Abramson, Alloy, Metalksy & Schmidt, 2001) 
and that impaired positive future thinking is associated with hopelessness rather than 
depression or dysphoria (e.g., Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; MacLeod et al., 1997). 
Hence, we tested the specificity of the positive future thinking-hopelessness 
relationship by including a measure of dysphoria (as well as hopelessness) in this 
study.  Finally, despite the plethora of studies describing the relations between 
optimism/pessimism and psychological well-being (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992; 
Carver & Gaines, 1987; Robinson-Whelen et al., 1997; Scheier et al., 2001), to our 
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knowledge, only one study has directly investigated the relationship between 
optimism/pessimism and hopelessness (Chang, 2002); and it was cross-sectional in 
design.  For this study, therefore, we conducted a prospective study and examined 
hopelessness in college students at the beginning of a semester and again, 10-12 
weeks later.    
There were two key research hypotheses.  First, we hypothesized that there 
would be a three-way interaction between stress, optimism/pessimism and positive 
future thinking to predict hopelessness 10-12 weeks later.  As these variables have 
never been studied together, our reasoned conjecture was that those individuals 
reporting high levels of pessimism, low levels of positive future thinking and high 
levels of stress would be more hopelessness than those who did not.  Second, we 
hypothesized that positive future thinking would not moderate the relationship 
between optimism/pessimism and dysphoria.  Given the inconsistencies in the 
literature (see O’Connor et al., 2004; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003), we did not 
formulate any hypotheses concerning negative future thinking.   
METHOD 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty one college students (102 women and 19 men) were 
recruited from a Scottish university. Prior to beginning the study, all students were 
informed that participation was voluntary, confidential and that even if they agreed, 
they could withdraw at any stage without explanation. Of the initial sample, 91 
completed measures at both time points, at Time 1 (T1) and 10-12 weeks later, at 
Time 2 (T2), at the beginning and end of semester.  Those who did not complete the 
Time 2 measures did not differ significantly from those who did on any of the 
variables measured in the study. As a result, the subsequent analyses are based on the 
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responses from the 91 participants. The mean age of the participants was 20.5 years 
(SD = 5.0) and the ages ranged from 17-46 years. The men and women did not differ 
significantly in age (t(89) = 1.14, NS) and the majority of the participants were not 
married (95%). We did not collect details of the racial/ethnic composition of our 
sample. However, the students at the university are predominantly White, 
representing 95 per cent of the student population. 
Measures 
Future Thinking.  The future thinking task (FTT; MacLeod et al., 1997) 
requires participants to think of potential future experiences across three time periods 
– the next week (including today), the next year and the next five to ten years.  This 
task is completed for positive as well as negative future experiences (e.g., “Please try 
to think of and write down as many things that you’re looking forward to (things that 
you enjoy) over the next year”).  Order of completion of positive and negative 
conditions (Valence) is counterbalanced, such that half of the participants complete 
the positive condition first while the other half complete the negative condition first.  
Order of presentation of items within each condition is constant (i.e., the next week, 
year, 5-10 years).  For each of the three time periods, participants are given one 
minute to generate as many responses as possible.  It is explained to the participants 
that the responses can be trivial or important, just that they should write down 
whatever comes to mind. The responses should be things that are going to happen, or 
are reasonably likely to happen.  Finally, participants are told to keep trying to 
generate responses until the time-limit is up2. 
Hopelessness. Hopelessness was measured using the 20-item Beck Hopelessness 
Scale (BHS; Beck et al., 1974). Participants are asked to indicate either agreement or 
disagreement with statements that assess pessimism for the future (e.g., “I look 
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forward to the future with hope and enthusiasm”). Higher scores represent elevated 
hopelessness. The maximum score is 20.  This is a reliable and valid measure that has 
been shown to predict eventual suicide (Beck et al., 1974, 1985; Holden & Fekken, 
1988).  In the present study, internal consistency was very good (Kuder-Richardson–
20 = .84 and .86 at Time 1 and Time 2, respectively).   
Dysphoria. The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD) is a 
20-item measure of dysphoria for use in the general population (Radloff, 1977).  
Participants are required to rate on a four point Likert-type scale (anchored at rarely or 
none of the time and most or all of the time) how often they have felt or behaved like 
each of the statements during the past week (e.g., “I felt that I could not shake off the 
blues even with help from my family or friends”).  Higher scores represent elevated 
depressive symptomatology.  The scale is reliable and valid (Radloff, 1991) and it 
exhibited very good internal consistency (αs = .90 and .91 at Time 1 and Time 2, 
respectively). 
Optimism/Pessimism.  Optimism/pessimism was measured by the Life 
Orientation Test (LOT; Scheier & Carver, 1985).  It includes four positively worded 
items (e.g., “I always look on the bright side of things”), four negatively worded items 
(e.g., “If something can go wrong for me, it will”), and four filler items (e.g., “It is 
easy for me to relax”).  Participants are asked to indicate either agreement or 
disagreement with each of the statements. The positively and negatively worded items 
(after reversal) are summed  to yield an overall measure of optimism/pessimism.  
Higher scores represent higher optimism.  The Life Orientation Test (LOT and LOT-
R) has been shown to exhibit temporal stability over 4 weeks (r=.79), 4 months 
(r=.68) and 12 months (r=.60; Scheier & Carver, 1985; Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 
1994).  In the present study, the internal consistency (α) was .80. 
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Stress. The Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; Cohen, Kamarck & Mermelstein, 
1983) is a 14-item global measure of self-appraised stress (e.g., “In the last month, 
how often have you been upset because of something that happened to you 
unexpectedly?”).  Participants are asked to rate the extent of agreement with these 
items across a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often).  
Higher scores reflect elevated levels of stress.  In this study, we employed the shorter 
4-item version of PSS.  Test-retest reliability and construct validity have been shown 
to be acceptable (Cohen & Williamson, 1988; Cohen et al., 1983).  Cronbach’s α for 
the present sample was .81. 
Procedure 
All participants were given a brief introduction of what the study would require 
and invited to take part. At Time l (T1), participants completed measures of future 
thinking, optimism/pessimism, hopelessness (BHS-T1) and dysphoria (CESD-T1). At 
Time 2 (T2), 10-12 weeks later, participants completed the measures of hopelessness 
(BHS-T2), dysphoria (CESD-T2) and stress (PSS-T2).  All study measures were 
administered to participants from two intact classes. All those who were approached 
agreed to participate. At Time 1, the future thinking task was administered first, 
followed by the self-report measures.  To control for transfer effects, the order of 
presentation of the self-report measures was counterbalanced. To ensure anonymity 
but to allow for the follow-up, participants were asked to place either a pseudonym or 
their registration number on the study measures. Ethical approval had been obtained 
from the University Psychology Department’s ethics committee. 
RESULTS 
Before presentation of the regression analyses, consistent with other future 
thinking studies in the field (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1997), we conducted an ANOVA to 
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confirm that it was reasonable to aggregate the positive and negative thoughts into 
composite scores.  A Valence (positive / negative future thoughts) x Period (week, 
year, 5-10 years) x Gender (male / female) mixed model ANOVA produced one 
significant main effect but no interactions; across all time periods, participants 
reported significantly more positive expectations for the future (M=12.02, SD=3.49) 
relative to the events that they were worried about (M=8.45, SD=3.42; F(1,89)=43.63, 
p<.001). The mean number of future thoughts by time period and valence is displayed 
in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The bivariate correlations for all the variables are displayed in Table 2. Given 
that there were no differences across the time periods (i.e., next week, year, 5-10 
years), we collapsed the future thinking measures into (1) total positive future 
thinking and (2) total negative future thinking3.    Positive future thinking was 
correlated with negative future thinking which was probably indicative of the shared 
variance associated with verbal fluency (r=.524, p<.001).  With the exception of the 
positive correlations between negative future thinking and CESD-T1 and BHS-T1 
(r=.227, p<.05, r=.253, p<.05 respectively), neither positive nor negative future 
thinking were associated with any of the other variable. Hopelessness and dysphoria 
at baseline (BHS-T1, CESD-T1) and at Time 2 (BHS-T2, CESD-T2) were correlated 
positively with each other, positively with stress but negatively with 
optimism/pessimism (all at least p<.01).   
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
We conducted four hierarchical regression analyses to investigate whether future 
thinking and stress moderated the relationship between optimism/pessimism and 
psychological distress to predict hopelessness or dysphoria at Time 2 over and above 
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baseline levels of distress 4.  Consistent with Aiken and West (1991), all predictors 
were centered before inclusion in the regression analyses. In all the regression 
analyses, initial levels of distress (BHS-T1 and CESD-T1) were entered at step 1.  
The three independent predictors were entered in the second step, i.e., stress, 
optimism/pessimism and negative or positive future thinking (see Table 3). Next, to 
test for moderation, the three relevant two-way interactions (i.e., multiplicative terms) 
were entered in step three followed by the appropriate three-way interaction in step 
four (Aiken & West, 1991)5.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Positive Future Thinking, Stress and Optimism/Pessimism as Predictors of 
Hopelessness and Dysphoria 
In the first regression analysis, we investigated the effects of positive future 
thinking, stress and optimism/pessimism to predict changes in hopelessness.  The 
final model yielded four significant effects: initials level of hopelessness (BHS-T1, β 
= .513, t(90) = 5.42, p<.001) and stress (β = .434, t(90) = 4.93, p<.001) were 
significant predictors of Time 2 hopelessness (BHS-T2).  The interaction between 
optimism/pessimism x stress was also significant (β = -.189, t(90)= -2.55, p<.05).  
However, this was qualified by the significant three-way interaction (β = -.223, t(90)= 
-2.74, p<.01).  To probe the three-way interaction, consonant with Aiken and West 
(1991), in two graphs we plotted the regression lines of best fit at high (one standard 
deviation above the mean) and low (one standard deviation below the mean) levels of 
stress and positive future thinking separately for the high pessimism and low 
pessimism groups (one standard deviation above and below the mean) (see Figure 1). 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
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Next, we tested each of the four simple slopes for significance, to determine 
whether they differed significantly from zero.  Among those high on pessimism, both 
the high and low stress lines were significantly different from zero (p<.05) whereas in 
the optimistic group only the high stress line was significantly different (p<.05).  
These analyses suggest that among the optimists, impaired positive future thinking is 
only associated with increased hopelessness when under stress.  However, there was 
an interesting pattern of results in the high stress pessimism group.  As anticipated 
low positive thinking was associated with increased hopelessness when under low 
levels of stress.  Contrary to expectations, in the high stress pessimism group, the 
presence of positive future thinking was associated with increased hopelessness.   
Given that the Aiken and West (1991) procedure plots hypothetical predictions 
generated from the regression model, it is possible that the model generates 
predictions which no individual actually attains.  To investigate whether this was the 
case, we performed a median split on each of the three independent variables and 
looked at the 8 cells of the study design.  This analysis revealed that 6/8 cells had 
between 9 and 22 participants, however, two of the cells contained five participants.  
These were the pessimism x low stress x high positive future thinking cell and the 
optimism x high stress x high positive thinking cell.  So, although all of the cells were 
populated, it would have been preferable to have more participants in two of the cells.   
The second hierarchical regression analysis focused on the same relationship 
with one difference, the outcome variable was dysphoria rather than hopelessness.  As 
is evident in Table 3, BHS-T1 and CESD-T1, as a block (∆ R2 =.30, p<.001), as well 
as stress (β = .739, t(90)= 8.64, p<.001) were the only significant predictors of 
dysphoria 10-12 weeks later, at time 2.  As predicted, there were no significant 
interactions. 
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Negative Future Thinking, Stress and Optimism/Pessimism as Predictors of 
Hopelessness and Dysphoria 
 Next, we investigated the moderating effects of stress and negative future 
thinking on the optimism/pessimism–distress relationship.  Hence, the third 
hierarchical regression analysis focused on hopelessness and, as before, the variables 
were entered into the regression equation in logical steps as described in Table 4.  On 
this occasion, there were only two significant predictors, independent effects of BHS-
T1 (β  = .515, t(90) = 4.98p<.001) and PSS-T2 (β  = .419, t(90) = 4.34, p<.001).  
None of the interactions were significant.  In the final regression, we looked at 
negative future thinking as a moderator in the optimism/pessimism–dysphoria 
relationship.  This analysis yielded one significant effect, for stress (β  = .723, t(90) = 
7.79, p<.001) and there were no interactions.    
DISCUSSION 
 This study yielded partial evidence in support of the two key hypotheses and 
extended our understanding of the relationship between generalized and specific 
expectancies.  First, stress and positive future thinking did moderate the relationship 
between optimism/pessimism and hopelessness.  These findings were strengthened by 
the fact that the interactions explained additional variance over and above that 
accounted for by the baseline measures of psychological distress.  As anticipated, low 
levels of positive future thinking were associated with increased distress among the 
high stress optimists and low stress pessimists.  However, we did not expect high 
levels of positive thinking to be associated with increased hopelessness among the 
high stress pessimists.  These findings point to a more complex relationship between 
positive future thinking and well-being than was previously thought.  The negative 
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effects of positive thoughts among the high stress pessimists may reflect the fact that 
the future thoughts represent opportunities for failure and as a result they have a 
pernicious effect on well-being.  Indeed, it may be that pessimists view future 
thoughts as events or experiences which are unobtainable.  Such an explanation is 
consistent with Carver and Scheier’s (1998) definition of pessimists, as individuals 
who expect bad experiences to happen.  What is more, the optimism and pessimism 
findings also supports a diathesis-stress model of optimism/pessimism.  The present 
study, therefore, suggests that impaired positive future thinking has deleterious effects 
on well-being under some but not all conditions.   Nonetheless, this is the first study 
to empirically investigate the optimism/pessimism–future thinking relationship and to 
demonstrate that future positive thinking has utility in the temporal prediction of 
hopelessness.   
The second hypothesis was supported.  As predicted, positive future thinking 
did not moderate the relationship between optimism/pessimism and dysphoria.  
Indeed, the only independent predictor of dysphoria was stress.  It appears that 
impaired positive future thinking has a particular effect, not on dysphoria per se, 
rather its effect seems to be circumscribed to hopelessness.   These data add to the 
growing body of research which posits that positive and negative cognitions are 
mediated via different motivational systems (namely the Behavioral Inhibition System 
and the Behavioral Activation System; Fowles, 1994; Gray, 1994; O’Connor & 
Forgan, 2006). 
Generalized and Specific Expectancies: A Case of Synergy? 
This is the first study to investigate the relationship between 
optimism/pessimism and changes in hopelessness prospectively.  It teases apart 
Chang’s (2002) cross-sectional finding that optimism/pessimism are strongly 
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correlated with hopelessness in Asian and Caucasian American college students: Our 
study suggests that the direct effects of generalized anticipations on hopelessness can 
be explained via initial levels of distress and time 2 stress; beyond this, they have no 
independent predictive utility.  However, optimism/pessimism does interact with 
stress and specific future expectations to predict change in psychological distress in 
the form of hopelessness. This is consonant with the classic work by Beck (1967) and 
Chang et al.’s (1997) findings that highlight the sometimes detrimental consequences 
of pessimism.   
In addition, the synergistic relationship between specific positive future 
expectations and optimism/pessimism is of interest clinically.   It identifies the types 
of cognitions (goals/expectancies) that should be targeted in therapy.  To this end, 
behavioral and cognitive techniques have been suggested, to train patients to encode 
and access particular memories (MacLeod  & Moore, 2000) and to develop positive 
schemas (Padesky, 1994; see also Pretzer & Walsh, 2001 for a discussion of the 
psychotherapeutic implications of optimism/pessimism).  In addition, it may be useful 
for pessimists to reframe positive cognitions to represent opportunities for success 
rather than failure.   
Self-regulation, Optimism and Pessimism 
 This study augments the existing evidence base for Carver and Scheier’s 
(1998) self-regulation model. It is evident that, not only are pessimists predisposed to 
exhibit generalized, low levels of motivation and tenacity when pursuing goals, but 
the impact of this predisposition can be strengthened or attenuated by the presence of 
specific future positive expectancies.  This finding is bolstered by our data showing 
that these future expectations are not correlated with either optimism or pessimism.  
 These data also extend Needles and Abramson (1990)’s study which found 
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that the occurrence of positive events and an enhancing attributional style interacted 
to produce a reduction in hopelessness among college students within a six week 
period. Our findings add to this work in two respects: first, they demonstrate that 
optimism/pessimism, another relatively stable personality dimension conjoint with 
positive future thinking, predicts hopelessness beyond initial levels of distress under 
certain conditions.  Second, they suggest that positive cognitions per se, as distinct 
from the experience of positive events, serve a function in the etiology of 
hopelessness.   
 Nevertheless, there are several issues regarding the nature of the relationship 
between generalized and specific expectancies that require elucidation.  For example, 
what mediates this relationship?  One possibility is that coping or social support may 
account for the relations between, for example, optimism/pessimism and specific 
positive expectations.  A recent study of college students found that the coping style 
which students used as well as their ability to generate more supportive social 
networks improved psychological well-being and adjustment (Brissette et al., 2002).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to speculate that pessimists who employ less problem-
focused coping strategies, particularly when they are stressed, may become less able 
to conceptualise positive future expectations as being positive.    
 A second issue concerns the extent to which optimism/pessimism is distinct 
from other personality dimensions.  For example, perfectionism has been implicated 
in the etiology of hopelessness, suicide risk and specific future expectations (Chang, 
1998c; Hewitt, Flett, & Turnbull-Donovan, 1992; Hunter & O’Connor, 2003; 
O’Connor & O’Connor, 2003).  Future research ought to determine its relation with 
both generalized and specific expectations.   Such a contribution by perfectionism 
would be consistent, not only with Carver & Scheier’s (1998) self-regulation model, 
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but also Baumeister’s and Williams’ models of suicidal behavior (Baumeister, 1990; 
Williams & Pollock, 2001; see also O’Connor, 2003).  Another possibility is that self-
esteem or extraversion might mediate the generalized-specific expectancies 
relationship given their established association with adjustment and 
optimism/pessimism (e.g., Marshall et al., 1992; Symister & Friend, 2003).   
Given that the focus of this paper was on hopelessness, we need to determine 
the generalizability of these findings by investigating whether the synergy between 
specific and generalized expectations has predictive utility across different 
populations and outcome measures as well as over longer time periods.  In particular, 
we should determine whether pessimism/optimism, positive future thinking and stress 
interact to predict suicidal thinking.  It would also be useful to replicate these findings 
using the revised life orientation test (LOT-R, Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994), 
although, given that the LOT and LOT-R are strongly correlated (r=.95 reported in 
Scheier et al., 1994), we would not anticipate any difficulties. One notable limitation 
of this study was the paucity of men in the sample.  Future research should confirm 
whether or not there are gender differences in this respect.  Another issue merits 
comment.  In the present study, for pragmatic reasons, we operationalised 
optimism/pessimism as a single bipolar dimension. Future research, with a larger 
sample, should investigate whether pessimism is the functional opposite of optimism 
or indeed, whether they are two distinct constructs? Finally, to our knowledge, this is 
the first study to investigate the relations between specific and generalized 
expectations.  Therefore, we urge some caution in the interpretation of these findings 
until they are replicated, in particular in the light of the observation that two of the 
cells of the interaction were not well populated within the present dataset.  Three-way 
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interactions are sometimes unstable and the present data may have been affected by 
the unequal distributions.   
In conclusion, the present research has accumulated empirical evidence to 
support the postulation that generalized expectancies can be moderated by specific 
future-oriented expectancies.  Moreover, these findings have conceptual, theoretical 
and clinical importance in the management of hopelessness. Taken together, they 
point to the fruits of integrating personality and cognitive processes, to better 
understand the self-regulation of affect.   
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Figure 1.  The relationship between positive future thinking and hopelessness as function of pessimism (Panel A)/optimism (Panel B). 
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Table 1.  The mean number of future thoughts (standard deviations in parentheses) by 
time period and valence 
 
 Next Week 
 
  Next Year  Next 5 – 10 years 
 
 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
 
Positive 
 
Negative 
Total 
 
3.85 
(1.53) 
2.57 
(1.94) 
3.97 
(1.33) 
3.00 
(1.35) 
4.21 
(1.55) 
2.88 
(1.59) 
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Table 2.  Zero order correlations for all the variables 
 
 Total 
Positive 
Thinking 
 
Total 
Negative 
Thinking 
 
BHS-T1 BHS-T2 
 
CESD-T1 CESD-T2 PSS-T2 Optimism/ 
Pessimism 
 
Positive  
Total 
-        
         
Negative 
Total 
.524*** -       
         
BHS-T1 .092 .253* -      
         
BHS-T2 .082 .205 .603*** -     
         
CESD-T1 .050 
 
.227* .456*** .607*** -    
         
CESD-T2 -.047 
 
.075 .301** .663*** .572*** -   
         
PSS-T2 
 
-.063 -.006 .315** .618*** .599*** .777*** -  
         
Optimism/ 
Pessimism 
.017 
 
-.148 -.637*** -.474*** -.552*** -.317** -.483*** - 
         
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 Note.  BHS-T1 = Time 1 Hopelessness, BHS-T2 = Time 2 Hopelessness, CESD-T1 = Time 1 
Depression, CESD-T2 = Time 2 Depression, PSS-T2 = Perceived Stress 
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Table 3. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses testing the moderating effects of stress and positive future thinking on the relationship  
between optimism/pessimism and hopelessness and dysphoria 
  
Predictor variable 
 
R 
 
R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
Final β 
 
F (2, 90) 
Dependent variable: Hopelessness (BHS-T2)  
Step 1: BHS-T1 
CESD-T1 
.681 .464  .513*** 
.105 
37.59*** 
Step 2: PSS-T2 
Optimism/Pessimism 
Total Positive Thinking  
.754 .568 .105 .434*** 
.095 
-.046 
6.80*** 
Step 3: Optimism/Pessimism x PSS-T2 
Total Positive Thinking x PSS-T2 
Total Positive Thinking x Optimism/Pessimism 
.775 .601 .033 -.189* 
.133 
.032 
2.22 
Step 4: Total Positive Thinking x Stress x 
Optimism/Pessimism 
.797 .635 .034 -.223** 7.52** 
Dependent variable: Dysphoria (CESD-T2)       
Step 1: BHS-T1 
CESD-T1 
.548 .300  .131 
.142 
18.65*** 
Step 2: PSS-T2 
Optimism/Pessimism 
Total Positive Thinking  
.798 .636 .336 .739*** 
.191 
-.092 
25.91*** 
Step 3: Optimism/Pessimism x PSS-T2 
Total Positive Thinking x PSS-T2 
Total Positive Thinking x Optimism/Pessimism 
.802 .643 .007 -.093 
.063 
-.008 
.51 
Step 4: Total Positive Thinking x Stress x 
Optimism/Pessimism 
.810 .656 .013 -.138 3.05 
       
 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001      
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Table 4. 
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses testing the moderating effects of stress and negative future thinking on the relationship  
between optimism/pessimism and hopelessness and dysphoria 
   
Predictor variable 
 
R 
 
R2 
 
∆ R2 
 
Final β 
 
F (2, 90) 
Dependent variable: Hopelessness (BHS-T2)  
Step 1: BHS-T1 
CESD-T1 
.679 .461  .515*** 
.083 
36.32*** 
Step 2: PSS-T2 
Optimism/Pessimism 
Total Negative Thinking  
.751 .565 .104 .419*** 
.138 
-.014 
6.52*** 
Step 3: Optimism/Pessimism x PSS-T2 
Total Negative Thinking x PSS-T2 
Total Negative Thinking x Optimism/Pessimism 
.778 .605 .041 -.116 
.144 
.041 
2.71 
Step 4: Total Negative Thinking x Stress x 
Optimism/Pessimism 
.789 .623 .018 -.158 3.72 
Dependent variable: Dysphoria (CESD-T2)       
Step 1: BHS-T1 
CESD-T1 
.538 .290  .108 
.120 
17.36*** 
Step 2: PSS-T2 
Optimism/Pessimism 
Total Negative Thinking  
.788 .622 .332 .723*** 
.191 
-.016 
23.96*** 
Step 3: Optimism/Pessimism x PSS-T2 
Total Negative Thinking x PSS-T2 
Total Negative Thinking x Optimism/Pessimism 
.800 .640 .019 -.040 
.098 
-.053 
1.38 
Step 4: Total Negative Thinking x Stress x 
Optimism/Pessimism 
.807 .651 .011 -.122 2.39 
       
 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001      
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1 Anti-goals are defined as values that an individual sees as undesirable (see Carver & Scheier, 1998, p. 
18). 
2 In previous case-control studies, participants have completed a measure of verbal fluency before they 
begin the Future Thinking Task (FTT), to ensure that the ‘experimental’ groups do not differ from the 
control groups in terms of general cognitive fluency.    As this was not a comparative study and given 
time constraints, this was deemed not to be necessary.  However, in the interests of rigour, in a 
previous study (O’Connor et al., 2004), we administered the Beck Hopelessness Scale and a measure of 
verbal fluency to 30 participants.  Correlational analyses revealed no significant associations.     
3 This is consistent with other studies in the field (e.g., MacLeod et al., 1998; O’Connor et al., 2000b; 
Hunter & O’Connor, 2003). 
4 Mean hopelessness increased from M=3.77 (BHS-T1) to M=4.01 (BHS-T2).  This increase was not 
significant (t(90)=.762, NS) 
5 Due to issues concerning statistical power, the interactions were examined using separate regression 
analyses (Chaplin, 1991).   
